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ARTICLES
When Counsel Abandonment Forecloses
Post-Conviction Relief: An Argument
for Applying the Doctrine of Cause and
Prejudice to the AEDPA Statute of Limitations
Katherine I. Puzone*
"Abandoned by counsel, Maples was left unrepresented at a critical time for
his state post-conviction petition, and he lacked a clue of any need to protect
himself prose. In these circumstances, no just system would lay the default at
Maples' death-cell door." 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Justice Ginsberg, writing for the majority in Maples v. Thomas, painted a stark
picture of the injustice facing a death-row inmate who was abandoned by his
attorneys. This Article uses the case of Robin Myers to illustrate the inconsistency in the law that applies when a post-conviction petitioner is abandoned by
his attorney. The result of this inconsistency is that the same court reached
opposite conclusions in the cases of two men on death row in Alabama. The
distinguishing fact between the two cases is not counsel's abandonment of his
client in the midst of complex post-conviction proceedings, but rather the
procedural posture of the two cases. In Maples, 2 even though the petitioner was
abandoned by his attorneys, he discovered the abandonment before the federal
statute of limitations lapsed. 3 In fact, the Office of the Alabama Attorney General
notified Mr. Maples that the deadline to file an appeal with the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals had lapsed and specifically informed him that only four weeks
remained to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 4 While new
counsel filed a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, the

* Associate Professor of Law, Barry University Duane 0. Andreas School of Law. J.D., cum /aude,
New York University School of Law, M. Phil. University of Cambridge, B.A. Trinity College. This
Article is dedicated to Robin Myers whose friendship, kindness, and bravery inspire me every day.
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I. Maple v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 917 (2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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claims raised in state court were considered "procedurally defaulted" because
they had not been presented to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the
Alabama Supreme Court. 5 In Maples, the United States Supreme Court held that
counsel's abandonment of Mr. Maples excused the procedural default, thus
allowing full federal review of the claims asserted in Mr. Maples' petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. 6
In another Alabama case, the courts denied review because the petitioner,
Robin Myers, was not notified of counsel's abandonment until after the federal
statute of limitations had run. 7 The requirements to excuse a statute of limitations
default are different than those that excuse a procedural default. 8 Excusing a
statute of limitations default requires a showing that the petitioner was "diligent"
in protecting his rights, a showing not required to excuse a procedural default. 9
Thus, in stark contrast to the result in Maples, Mr. Myers will likely be executed
without any federal court having reviewed his federal constitutional claims. 10
Contrary to Justice Ginsberg's majority opinion in Maples, the default has been
"laid at [Mr. Myers'] death-cell door." 11
II.

THE POST-CONVICTION PROCESS

12

People often refer to the lengthy appellate process in capital cases. What
many do not realize is that most of that process is not an appeal, but rather
post-conviction. 13 Once a defendant is convicted and sentenced to death, the
state appellate courts review the case. 14 Once the conviction and sentence are
affirmed, the defendant may petition the United States Supreme Court to review

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Myers v. Allen, 420 Fed. App'x 924, 927 (I Ith Cir. 2011).
8. See Maples, 123 S. Ct. at 922 ("Cause for a procedural default exists where "something external to
the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him[,] ... 'impeded [his] efforts to comply
with the State's procedural rule.") (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991), quoting
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). In contrast, a statute of limitations default can only be
cured when a petitioner demonstrates that equitable tolling is warranted. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S.
63I (2010) (holding that the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d) can be equitably
tolled in appropriate cases). Equitable tolling requires the petitioner to show "(!) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way" and
prevented timely filing." Id., quoting, Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
9. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (equitable tolling requires a showing by the petitioner that "he has
been pursuing his rights diligently"); Maples, 123 S. Ct. at 922 (demonstrating "cause" for a procedural
default requires a showing by the petitioner that something external to the petitioner caused the default).
10. See Myers, 420 Fed. Appx. At 928.
11. Maples, 123 S. Ct. at 917.
12. This Part of the Article is intended as a general overview of post-conviction procedure for those
unfamiliar with this stage of litigation in capital cases. It is not in any way intended to be an exhaustive
description of this complex area of the law.
13. See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3.5(a)(6) (LexisNexis, 6th ed. 201 l) (describing the role of state post-conviction proceedings).
14. Id. at§ 5.1.
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his case. 15 Once that petition is denied, or the time to file such a petition has
expired, the conviction and sentence are deemed final. 16
Once a conviction and death sentence become final, everything changes. The
process with which most people are familiar is essentially turned on its head. The
defendant has lost the presumption of innocence and must petition the courts for
relief from an unconstitutional conviction or sentence. 17 The petitioner must
seek review first in the state courts, most often by filing a post-conviction petition
with the same judge who presided over his trial. 18 The grounds for state
post-conviction relief are narrow 19 and any issues that could have been, but were
not, raised on direct appeal are barred. 20 Discovery is limited and evidentiary
hearings are rarely granted. 21 Each claim that the petitioner plans to raise in state
or federal court, along with its supporting facts, must be set out in the initial state
post-conviction petition. 22 If the state trial court denies post-conviction relief,
all claims in the initial post-conviction petition must be presented to the state
appellate courts. 23 Once the state post-conviction process is complete, the
petitioner may petition for relief in federal court. 24
In state capital cases, post-conviction relief in federal court is governed by
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 25 The
petitioner files a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the warden of the
state's prison system alleging that he is being held in custody by the state in

15. Id.
16. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 295 (1989) (defining "final" to mean a case "where the
judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for
certiorari had elapsed") (internal citation omitted).
17. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1993).
18. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. PRo. 32.5 ("Petitions filed under this rule shall be filed in and decided by
the court in which the petitioner was convicted. If a petition is filed in another court, it shall be transferred
to the court where the conviction occurred"); see also ALA. R. CRIM. PRO. 32.1 ("any defendant who has
been convicted of a criminal offense may institute a proceeding in the court of original conviction").
19. See, e.g .. ALA. R. CRIM PRO. 32.1; see HERTLAND LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at§§ 7.1, 7.2.
20. See, e.g .. ALA. R. CRIM. PRO. 32.2; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1973) (holding that
claims not presented in state appellate proceedings in conformity with state procedural rules are not
cognizable in federal habeas proceedings absent a showing of cause and prejudice); Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107 ( 1982) (applying the rule of Wainwright to bar federal habeas review of claims not raised at
trial by a contemporaneous objection as required by state procedural rules).
21. See Christopher Flood, Closing the Circle: Case v. Nebraska and the Future of Habeas Reform,
27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 633, 657 (2001-02).
22. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at § 6.2 ("federal exhaustion and procedural default
doctrines compel prisoners, when permitted by state law and practice, to include in their state
postconviction applications all claims that might warrant federal habeas corpus relief and that were not
exhaustively litigated at trial and on direct appeal in the same case.").
23. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at§ 23; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 (b)-(c) (requiring exhaustion of
all available state remedies as a predicate to seeking federal habeas relief); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509
( 1982) (holding that a federal district court must dismiss a federal habeas petition containing both
exhausted and unexhausted claims).
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (providing remedies in federal court for state prisoners).
25. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2013)).
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violation of his federal constitutional rights. 26 AEDPA contains very strict
procedural rules and a one-year statute of limitations that runs from the time the
conviction becomes final. 27 This statute of limitations is tolled during state
post-conviction proceedings. 28 A federal court can only grant relief if the
petitioner demonstrates that the state court ruling "resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."29
As noted above, all claims presented to a federal habeas court must be properly
raised and litigated in state court. For example, all claims must be "exhausted"
before being presented to a federal court, meaning that there are no avenues of
relief open to the petitioner in state court. 3 Claims cannot be "procedurally
defaulted" if they are to be raised in federal court.3 1 A procedural default occurs
when a claim is raised in the state trial court and is not presented to the state
appellate courts. 32
The difference between a procedural default and a failure to exhaust was
explained by Justice Stevens in his dissent in O'Sullivan v. Boerckel. 33 A claim is
unexhausted if the petitioner still has an available avenue to pursue relief in
state court. 34 In that case, principles of comity and federalism require a petitioner
to seek relief in state court prior to seeking federal habeas relief. 35 "[T]he
exhaustion inquiry focuses entirely on the availability of state procedures at the

°

26. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (the correct respondent in a federal petition for
a writ of habeas corpus is "the person who has custody over [the petitioner]"), quoting, 28 U.S.C. § 2242;
see also § 2243 (a writ of habeas corpus "shall be directed to the person having custody of the person
detained").
27. See§ 2244(d)(I).
28. See§ 2244 (d)(2) ("The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted
toward any period of limitation under this subsection.")
29. § 2254(d)(I ).
30. See HERT/. & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at§ 23; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 (b)-(c) (requiring exhaustion of
all available state remedies as a predicate to seeking federal habeas relief.
31. See Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922 ("As a rule, a state prisoner's habeas claims may not be entertained
by a federal court "when (I) 'a state court [has) declined to address [those] claims because the prisoner
had failed to meet a state procedural requirement,' and (2) 'the state judgment rests on independent and
adequate state procedural grounds."' quoting Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S.--,--, 131 S. Ct. 1120,
1127 (2011) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S., at 729-730).
32. The bar to federal review may be lifted, however, if "the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the
[procedural] default [in state court] and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal
law." Id. at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546; see also Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 84-85.
33. 526 U.S. 838 (1999).
34. Id. (The question of exhaustion "refers only to remedies still available at the time of the federal
petition, it requires federal courts to ask whether an applicant for federal relief could still get the relief he
seeks in the state system.") (internal quotation and citations omitted) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
35. Id. ("If the applicant currently has a state avenue available for raising his claims, a federal court, in
the interest of comity, must generally abstain from intervening. This time-honored rule has developed
over several decades of cases, always with the goal of respecting the States' interest in passing first on
their prisoners' constitutional claims in order to act as the primary guarantor of those prisoners' federal
rights, and always separate and apart from rules of waiver.") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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time when the federal court is asked to entertain a habeas petition." 36 In contrast,
the doctrine of procedural default focuses on a petitioner's waiver of certain
claims. 37 If a state prisoner fails to raise a claim in an available state proceeding,
and no avenue to raise the claim in state court remains at the time the petition for
federal habeas relief is filed, the claim is considered procedurally defaulted. 38 A
procedural default can only be cured upon a showing of "cause and prejudice" 39
or a "fundamental miscarriage of justice."4 Cause in this context is defined as
"something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed
to him." 41 In sum, before seeking federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must
"invok[e] one complete round of the State's established appellate review
process."42
As noted above, AEDPA contains a very strict one-year statute of limitations.
A federal habeas petitioner must file his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court within one year of one of four statutory triggering dates. 43 The text
of AEDPA provides that the statute of limitations is tolled while a properly filed
state petition for post-conviction relief is pending. 44 In cases in which a timely
petition for federal habeas review is not filed, the Supreme Court has held that the
AEDPA statute of limitations is a non-jurisdictional statute of limitations that can
be equitably tolled. 45 In other words, a statute of limitations default can be lifted
if the petitioner can demonstrate extraordinary circumstances beyond his control
that caused the missed deadline, as well as diligence in pursuing relief in the
federal courts. 46 In contrast, the doctrine of cause and prejudice does not require a
showing of diligence on the part of the petitioner. 47
The fact that courts do not apply the doctrine of cause and prejudice to the
AEDPA statute of limitations has resulted in inconsistent results in cases with

°

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 ( 1986).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991).
42. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l) ("A I-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period
shall run from the latest of-(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (8) the date on which the impediment to
filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is
removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the
constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence.")
44. § 2244(d)(2).
45. See, e.g., Holland, 560 U.S. at 653.
46. Id.
47. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986).
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nearly identical facts. In Maples v. Thomas, 48 the Supreme Court held that
counsel's abandonment of a death-sentenced, post-conviction petitioner constitutes "cause" for a procedural default under the Court's cause and prejudice
doctrine. 49 To date, no court has held that the doctrine of cause and prejudice
applies to a statute of limitations default.so Therefore, Mr. Myers was required to
satisfy the criteria for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.s 1
Ill.

MAPLES

In Maples, the petitioner was represented by two attorneys at Sullivan &
Cromwell, a large New York law firm, and John Butler, a local attorney in
Huntsville, Alabama. Counsel filed a petition for state post-conviction relief
pursuant to the Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. By the time the trial
court denied the petition, both New York attorneys had left Sullivan & Cromwell
for other employment. The agreement between the New York attorneys and
Mr. Butler was that he would serve only as a mechanism for the pro hac vice
admission of the New York attorneys and would provide no substantive role in
the case. Notice of the trial court's denial of Mr. Maples' Rule 32 petition was
mailed to Sullivan & Cromwell and returned. An identical notice was mailed to
Mr. Butler, but he assumed that the New York attorneys would take appropriate
action. After a notice of appeal was not filed, the Office of the Alabama Attorney
General notified Mr. Maples that a critical deadline had been missed and
informed him that only four weeks remained before the deadline to file a petition
for federal habeas relief remained. s2 After receiving this letter, Mr. Maples called
his mother and new counsel was obtained.s 3 Mr. Maples did not make any effort
to monitor his own case prior to his receipt of the State's letter.s 4 While a timely
petition for federal habeas relief was filed, because the claims raised in the
Rule 32 Petition were not presented to the Alabama appellate courts, those claims
were deemed procedurally defaulted.ss
48. 132 s. Ct. 912 (2012).
49. A procedural default occurs when a claim has not been presented to every appropriate state court
and at the time there is no available means by which to present the claim in state court. Id. at 927.
50. However, as discussed more fully below, in United States v. Montano, 381 F.3d 1265, 1268-69,
1272-73, 1274 n.8 (l lth Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Montano, 398 F.3d
1276 (l lth Cir. 2005), the Eleventh Circuit seemed to imply without discussion that a statute of
limitations default could be overcome by a showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence.
51. Myers, 420 Fed. App'x at 928.
52. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 920 ("[O]n August 13, 2003 ... the attorney representing the State in
Maples' collateral review proceedings, sent a letter directly to Maples ... [informing him] of the missed
deadline for initiating an appeal within the State's system, and [notifying] him that four weeks remained
during which he could file a federal habeas petition. Hayden mailed the letter to Maples only, using his
prison address. No copy was sent to Maples' attorneys of record, or to anyone else acting on Maples'
behalf.") (internal citations omitted).
53. Id. ("Upon receiving the State's letter, Maples immediately contacted his mother.").
54. Id.
55. Id. at 927.
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The lower courts held that attorney abandonment could not constitute cause for
a procedural default. In so holding the lower courts relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Coleman v. Thompson which held that ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel could not constitute cause for a procedural default. 56 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that attorney abandonment can constitute cause
for a procedural default.

IV.

THE CASE OF ROBIN MYERS

Robin Myers was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in
Morgan County, Alabama for the 1991 murder of Ludie Mae Tucker. 57
Mr. Myers' conviction and death sentence were upheld by the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals58 and the Supreme Court of Alabama. 59 The Supreme Court
of the United States denied Mr. Myers' petition for review by that Court. 60
Represented by volunteer counsel from Tennessee, Mr. Myers filed a petition for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. 61 The
petition was denied and volunteer counsel filed a timely appeal to the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals. 62 The appeal was denied and notice was mailed only
to out-of-state volunteer counsel. 63 At this point, volunteer counsel abandoned
Mr. Myers. 64 Mr. Myers was not aware that the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals denied his appeal until he received a letter from the Office of the
Alabama Attorney general notifying him that all relevant deadlines-both state
and federal-had lapsed. 65 With the help of other prisoners, Mr. Myers obtained
new counsel and a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed in federal court
in 2004. 66
In Mr. Myers' case, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the facts were strikingly
similar to those the Supreme Court suggested would satisfy the "extraordinary
circumstances" requirement in Holland v. Florida. 67 However, the Eleventh
Circuit did not reach the question of whether counsel's abandonment of
Mr. Myers constituted extraordinary circumstances because the court found that

56. 501 U.S. at 755.
57. See Ex parte Myers, 699 So. 2d 1285, 1286 (Ala. 1997). While the jury returned a life verdict, the
trial judge exercised his discretion and overrode the verdict and imposed a sentence of death. Id.
58. See Myers v. State, 699 So. 2d 1281 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).
59. Id. at n.2.
60. See Myers v. Alabama, 522 U.S. 1054 (1998).
61. See Myers v. Allen, 420 Fed. App'x at 926.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. ("While Schwarz's inexcusable abandonment is strikingly similar to the "extraordinary
circumstance" of abandonment in Holland, we need not reach that issue because Myers cannot show that
he has exercise reasonable diligence in pursuing his rights.").
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Mr. Myers did not exercise the requisite diligence. 68 The court's ruling was based
on the fact that Mr. Myers, who grew up in dire poverty and functions at
approximately a second-grade level, 69 had not made an effort to follow his case in
state post-conviction. 70 No such diligence requirement is imposed on a petitioner
where the applicable test was cause and prejudice.
The result is that while some prisoners sentenced to death will have their
claims receive a full review on the merits in federal court, Mr. Myers, whose case
was rejected by the Supreme Court, 71 will likely be executed. The disparate
results demonstrate how the current focus on complex procedural rules can have
fundamentally unfair results.
A. Post-Conviction Counsel's Abandonment of Mr. Myers
The United States Supreme Court denied Mr. Myers' Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari on January 12, 1998.72 At that point, the clock began to run on the
AEDPA statute of limitations. 73 Mr. Myers had 365 days from the Supreme
Court's denial of his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to file a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in federal court. 74 Because the AEDPA statute of limitations
is tolled during state post-conviction proceedings, 75 it was imperative that
Mr. Myers' counsel file a state post-conviction petition before the one-year
deadline expired. It was equally critical that the case remain "properly filed" in
state court, meaning that all appeals and motions for rehearing had to be filed in a
timely manner. 76 If a state procedural rule was not followed and a state deadline
missed, the case would no longer be "properly filed" in state court and the
AEDPA clock would start to run again. 77
In January 1998, Earle Schwarz, an attorney in private practice in Tennessee,
agreed to take his first capital case. 78 Mr. Schwarz was made aware of the extent

68. Id.
69. See Testimony at the evidentiary hearing held in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama on October 10-12, 2006 (on file with author).
70. Myers v. Allen, 420 Fed. App'x at 928 ("Myers claims that his cognitive impairments and reliance
on counsel who had abandoned him made it reasonable for Myers to do nothing until he learned that his
execution was scheduled. Although Myers's circumstances do yield a very low bar for what level of
diligence is reasonable, he still bears the burden of showing he did something to at least attempt to inquire
into the status of his case.").
71. Myers v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 2771 (2012) (denying Mr. Myers' petition for a writ of certiorari).
72. Myers v. Alabama, 522 U.S. 1054 (1998).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(I).
74. § 2244(d)(l)(a).
75. § 2244(d)(2).
76. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 236 (2002) (holding that a petitioner's claim is "pending" for
the entire term of state court review, including those intervals between one state court's judgment and the
filing of an appeal with a higher state court).
77. Id.
78. See Letter from Elisabeth Semel, Director, American Bar Association Death Penalty Representation Project, to Earle J. Schwarz (Jan. 31, 1998) (on file with the author) [hereinafter January 31 Letter];
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of his obligations as counsel to a death-sentenced inmate. 79 In July 1998,
Mr. Schwarz agreed to accept an Alabama case, and thereby committed himself
to representing Mr. Myers in all state and federal post-conviction proceedings. 80
On December 17, 1998, Mr. Schwarz filed a timely Petition for Relief Pursuant
to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure in the Morgan County
Circuit Court (Rule 32 Petition). 81 As described in Part II, this is the initial step in
obtaining post-conviction relief in state court. A petitioner must pursue postconviction relief in the state court before he files a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court. 82 The Circuit Court denied Mr. Myers' petition and Mr.
Schwarz filed a timely notice of appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals. 83 Mr. Myers' appeal was denied by the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals on February 21, 2003. 84
After appealing the denial of Mr. Myers' Rule 32 petition to the Alabama Court
of Criminal Appeals, Mr. Schwarz abandoned the case. Mr. Schwarz never
informed Mr. Myers that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals had denied his
appeal. 85 Mr. Schwarz did not tell Mr. Myers that he would not pursue relief on
his behalf in the Alabama Supreme Court or in federal court. 86 After the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals denied Mr. Myers' appeal, Mr. Schwarz had no further
contact with Mr. Myers; he never informed Mr. Myers that he was no longer
representing him. 87
Mr. Schwarz admitted his abandonment of Mr. Myers in a Declaration
submitted in federal court. 88 This Declaration was submitted as an attachment to
Mr. Myers' Opposition to the State's Motion to Dismiss his petition for federal
habeas relief on the ground that it was untimely.

B. Subsequent litigation
Because Mr. Schwarz had represented Mr. Myers competently for almost five
years, and had kept him informed of all developments in the case, Mr. Myers
believed that his case remained pending on appeal. As Mr. Myers' deadlines ran

Declaration of Earle J. Schwarz at 'II 2, Myers v. Campbell, No. CV-04-C-618-NE (N.D. Ala. Sep. 27,
2004) [hereinafter Declaration of Earl Schwarz).
79. January 31 Letter, supra note 78, at 4 ("[i)f relief is denied by the state judge-and you must
assume it will be-your firm will be expected to follow the case through proceedings in federal court and,
ultimately, clemency if habeas efforts fail").
80. See Letter from Elisabeth Semel, Director, American Bar Association, to Earle J. Schwarz
(July 13, 1998) (on file with the author).
81. See 420 Fed. App'x at 926.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(l)(A).
83. See Myers v. State, 699 So. 2d 1281, 1281 (1996).
84. Id.
85. Declaration of Earle J. Schwarz, supra note 78, at 'II 6.
86. Id. at 'II 9.
87. Id.
88. See id.
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one after another, he sat on death row unaware of what was happening with his
case. While this situation could have been prevented if the state court had sent
notice of its decision directly to Mr. Myers, it sent notice only to the volunteer
attorney in Tennessee who had already abandoned him. 89 Mr. Myers only learned
that that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied his appeal when he
received a Jetter from the Office of the Alabama Attorney General notifying him
that all state and federal deadlines had run. 90
With the assistance of other prisoners, Mr. Myers obtained new counsel. 91
On March 25, 2004, Mr. Myers filed his initial federal habeas petition in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. 92 The
State moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was untimely. 93 The
State argued that Mr. Myers' petition was untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(l)(A) because it had not been filed within one year of the conclusion
of direct review in the case. 94 In opposition to the State's Motion, counsel for
Mr. Myers argued, inter alia, that counsel's abandonment and the failure of the
State court to provide direct notice of its decision to Mr. Myers both warranted
equitable tolling, 95 and constituted cause for the statute of limitations default.
After several years of litigation, the district court dismissed Mr. Myers'
petition for federal habeas relief as untimely. The district court found that the
circumstances did not warrant equitable tolling and declined to apply a cause and
prejudice analysis to the AEDPA statute of limitations. The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed, holding that Mr. Myers had not been diligent in pursuing postconviction relief96 despite the fact that he suffers from severe impairments in
intellectual functioning and is functionally illiterate. The United States Supreme
Court denied Mr. Myers' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in 2012. 97

C. Contrast with Maples
As set forth above, Mr. Myers did not receive a Jetter from the Office of the
Alabama Attorney General until after the AEDPA statute of limitations had
expired. This fact resulted in his petition for federal habeas relief being filed late.
Therefore, under prevailing Supreme Court case Jaw, Mr. Myers was required to
satisfy the requirements for equitable tolling, including diligence. The focus of
89. See ALA. R. Arr. P. l 7(a) (service of notice of orders on a party represented by counsel shall be
made on counsel).
90. See Letter from Office of Alabama Attorney General to Earle Schwarz (Feb. 13, 2004) (on file with
the author).
91. See Myers, 420 Fed. App'x at 926.
92. Id.
93. See State's Motion to Dismiss Habeas Petition as Untimely (on file with the author).
94. Id.
95. The AEDPA statute of limitations is a non-jurisdictional statute of limitations that can be equitably
tolled. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
96. See Myers, 420 Fed. App'x at 928.
97. Myers v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 2771 (2012).
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the Eleventh Circuit on Mr. Myers' alleged failure to monitor his own case
highlights the disparity between the outcome in Mr. Myers' case and in Maples.
Like Mr. Myers, Mr. Maples took no action to follow his case or find substitute
counsel until he received the State's letter. 98 In Mr. Myers' case, the courts saw
this as a basis to deny equitable tolling.
As detailed above, Mr. Myers' attorney, Earle Schwarz, was court-appointed
and did not follow the rules required for appointed counsel to withdraw. 99 In
Maples, Justice Ginsberg focused on the fact that Mr. Maples' attorneys were also
court-appointed and similarly failed to follow the rules governing withdrawal by
appointed counsel. 100 While the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged Mr. Schwarz's
"inexcusable abandonment," in Mr. Myers' case, it concluded that Mr. Myers'
federal habeas petition was untimely due to his purported Jack of diligence. 101
In Maples, Justice Ginsberg also noted the fact that the clerk of court took no
steps in order to ensure that Mr. Maples' received notice of a critical decision in
his case. 102 As set forth above, the court clerk in Mr. Myers' case did not send a
copy of the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals directly to
Mr. Myers. 103
In Maples, the Supreme Court focused on counsel's abandonment of their
client and failed to place the consequences for that abandonment at Mr. Maples'
"death-cell door." 104 The Court held that counsel's abandonment of their client in
violation of all applicable rules along with the trial court's failure to notify
Mr. Maples of a key decision in his case constituted cause for the procedural
default of the claims raised in the state trial court in post-conviction but not
presented to the State's appellate courts. 105 Not only did the Supreme Court find
that counsel's abandonment of their client constituted cause for the procedural
default, the Court held this despite the fact that Mr. Maples was also represented
by a local attorney. 106 It was undisputed that local counsel received notice of
the trial court's decision, but the Supreme Court accepted at face value the
representation that local counsel's role was simply to provide a mechanism for

98. Id. ("Upon receiving the State's letter, Maples immediately contacted his mother.").
99. See generally Declaration of Earle J. Schwarz, supra note 78.
I 00. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 919 (Seven months after the last action taken by the trial court, Mr. Maples'
court-appointed attorneys "left [the law firm in New York at which they were associates) ... Neither
attorney told Maples of their departure ... or of their resulting inability to continue to represent him. In
disregard of Alabama law, neither attorney sought the trial court's leave to withdraw. Compounding [the
attorneys') inaction, no other ... lawyer entered an appearance on Maples' behalf, moved to substitute
counsel, or otherwise notified the court of any change in Maples' representation.") (internal citations
omitted).
IOI. See generally Myers, 420 Fed. App'x 924.
102. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 919 (2011).
103. See supra Part IV.B.
104. Maples, 132S.Ct.at917.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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the New York attorneys to be admitted pro hac vice. J07 Mr. Schwarz did not have
a local attorney move his admission pro hac vice, 108 therefore, Mr. Myers did not
have the extra protection of having his case monitored by a local attorney. In
addition, nothing in the Court's opinion in Maples indicates that Mr. Maples
suffered from the type of severe cognitive deficits that afflict Mr. Myers.
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg held that "[a]bandoned by counsel,
Maples was left unrepresented at a critical time for his state postconviction
petition, and he lacked a clue of any need to protect himself pro se. In these
circumstances, no just system would lay the default at Maples' death-cell
door." 109 Despite nearly identical facts, the Court in Maples granted relief after
focusing on counsel's abrogation of their most basic duties to their client. 110 In
stark contrast, the Eleventh Circuit denied relief in Mr. Myers' case because
it focused on Mr. Myers' purported failure to monitor his own case. No such
duty was imposed on Mr. Maples. "[H]abeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable
remedy." 111 The disparate result results in Maples and Myers highlight the
inequitable results that follow when courts apply different tests to procedural and
statute of limitations defaults caused by counsel abandonment.
V. THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSE AND PREJUDICE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE
AEDPA STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Maples v. Thomas, 112 the Supreme Court held that counsel's abandonment
of a death-sentenced post-conviction petitioner constitutes "cause" for a procedural default under the Court's cause and prejudice doctrine. 113 As described in
Part IV, Mr. Myers was likewise abandoned by his attorney. Mr. Myers was not
granted relief, however, because, in his case, attorney abandonment caused a
statute of limitations default rather than a procedural default.
AEDPA is a non-jurisdictional statute, thus its statute of limitations can be
equitably tolled. 114 The Supreme Court held in Holland v. Florida that equitable
tolling requires that a petitioner demonstrate extraordinary circumstances and
diligence. 115 The courts reviewing Mr. Myers case held that, despite significant
cognitive impairments, the fact that Mr. Myers did not take any steps to protect
his rights until he received a letter from the State informing him that all of his

107. Id. at 919.
108. See Order Admitting Earle J. Schwarz to practice pro hac vice dated April 23, 1999 (on file with
the author).
109. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 917.
110. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 659 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) ("Common sense dictates
that a litigant cannot be held constructively responsible for the conduct of an attorney who is not
operating as his agent in any meaningful sense of that word.")
111. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995).
112. 132S.Ct.912(2012).
113. Id.
114. See Holla11d, 560 U.S. at 644-46.
115. Id.
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deadlines had run required a finding that he was not diligent. Thus, equitable
tolling was denied. Barring clemency or another form of relief in a successor
petition, Mr. Myers will be executed without any federal review of his conviction
and death sentence. The difference in result between Mr. Myers' case and that of
Maples demonstrates that the jurisprudence governing post-conviction relief
for death-sentenced inmates is still rife with the arbitrariness identified by the
Court in Furman v. Georgia 116 when it struck down capital punishment in its
then-existing form.
Applying a cause and prejudice analysis to the AEDPA statute of limitations
would create consistency between the rules governing procedural defaults,
decrease the arbitrariness in the system and allow courts to review on the merits
claims raised by post-conviction petitioners who were unable to meet the federal
statute of limitations because they were abandoned by their attorney. There is
no reason a capital post-conviction petitioner should be able to have a procedural
default cured due to attorney abandonment but be executed if such abandonment causes a statute of limitations default. This distinction is especially critical
in cases in which the petitioner is cognitively impaired because such impairments
make it much more difficult-if not impossible-to satisfy the diligence
requirement for equitable tolling.

A. Reducing Discrepancies Between Similar Cases
Prior to the enactment of AEDPA, under Supreme Court case law, claims that
were procedurally defaulted in state court could be reviewed by a federal habeas
court upon a showing of cause and prejudice. 117 While AEDPA did not codify the
doctrine of cause and prejudice, courts have continued to apply it to procedural
bars post-AEDPA. 118 The reason cause and prejudice was not applied to the
statute of limitations prior to AEDPA is simply because that there was no federal
statute of limitations prior to AEDPA. 119 Logically, if cause and prejudice applies
to a procedural default, there is no reason it should not apply to a statute of
limitations default, especially in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Holland
that the statute is not jurisdictional. 120
Both Holland and Maples relied on an agency analysis. 121 Once an attorney
abandons her client, she is no longer acting as her client's agent and her acts
cannot be imputed to that client. Even though the State does not have a
constitutional obligation to provide counsel to indigent post-conviction petition-

116. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
117. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 ( 1977); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 ( 1986).
118. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
119. See HERT/. & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at§ 5.2 ("Until 1996 [the year AEDPA was enacted], there
was no fixed statute of limitations for filing federal habeas corpus petitions.")
120. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 654(2010) (holding that the AEDPA statute of limitations
is non-jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled).
121. Holland, 560 U.S. at 659; Maples, 132 S. Ct. 912, 915 (2011).
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ers, it must "assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present
his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process." 122 The Supreme
Court has consistently utilized a due process framework to analyze claims
concerning access to the courts for indigent petitioners pursuing discretionary
appeals and post-conviction relief. 123
While a State has great discretion in devising means to assure that indigent
defendants have an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly in postconviction, "when a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant
discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accordance with the dictates
of the Constitution and, in particular, in accordance with the Due Process
Clause." 124 A body of Supreme Court case law demonstrates that state law and
procedure governing state post-conviction must comply with the Federal Due
Process Clause.
In Pennsylvania v. Finley, 125 the Supreme Court reviewed Pennsylvania's
post-conviction system. The Court held that the petitioner had not been denied
the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause where appointed
post-conviction counsel reviewed the record, consulted with his client, determined that there were no meritorious issues, notified the trial court of his
conclusions in writing, and requested permission to withdraw. 126 The petitioner in Finley argued that the failure of appointed post-conviction counsel to
follow the procedure required by Anders v. California, 127 violated his right to
due process. 128 In holding that the petitioner had not been deprived of his
constitutional rights, the Finley Court reaffirmed that post-conviction petitioners
have a right to the "fundamental fairness exacted by the Due Process Clause." 129
Because the "respondent [had] received exactly that which she [was] entitled to
receive under state law-an independent review of the record by competent
counsel-she cannot claim any deprivation without due process." 130
The Supreme Court held that there was no due process violation in Finley
because the petitioner "received exactly that which she [was] entitled to receive

122. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 ( 1974).
123. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987) (holding that conduct of appointed
post-conviction attorney comported with "fundamental fairness" guaranteed by the Due Process Clause);
Ross, 417 U.S. at 610-11 (holding that Due Process Clause did not require appointment of counsel to
indigent defendants to pursue discretionary appeals); Murray v Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (applying
due process analysis of Finley to death-sentenced, post-conviction petitioners).
124. Finley, 481 U.S. at 558 (quoting Evitts v. lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985)).
125. 481U.S.551 (1987).
126. Finley, 481 U.S. at 553.
127. 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (Counsel seeking to withdraw must seek permission from the court. A brief
referring to "anything in the record that might arguably support an appeal" must accompany such request.
A copy of the be "should be furnished to the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he
chooses; the court-not counsel-then proceeds .... ").
128. Finley, 481 U.S. at 553-554.
129. Id. at555.
130. Id. at 558.
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under state law." 131 Mr. Myers, however, did not receive exactly that which
he was entitled to receive under state law. Under the Alabama rules, once
Mr. Schwarz was appointed to represent Mr. Myers, he was obligated to continue
to represent him in the Alabama state courts through all appeals unless he was
relieved of this obligation by an order of the trial court. 132 While pro se
petitioners receive notice of decisions in their cases directly from the court,
represented parties do not. 133 In the case of a represented party, only counsel
of record receives notice of the decision of an Alabama appellate court. 134
Mr. Schwarz did not withdraw as required under the Alabama rules. As with
counsel in Maples, he remained counsel of record and the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals only sent notice of its decision to him. Because Mr. Schwarz
simply terminated his representation of Mr. Myers without notice to anyone,
Mr. Myers did not learn that his appeal had been denied until he received the
State's letter more than one year later. The fact that the state court only sent notice
to an out-of-state volunteer attorney who had abandoned Mr. Myers' case in
violation of Alabama rules deprived Mr. Myers of precisely what he was entitled
to receive under Alabama law: notice of a critical decision in his case. 135
Cause for a procedural default exists whenever "something external to the
petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him" results in the
"default." 136 Attorney error at a stage of a criminal proceeding at which counsel
is not constitutionally guaranteed cannot constitute cause. This is because an
attorney normally acts as the agent of his client. Absent a constitutional violation,
the error of the attorney is imputed to the client and is not external. 137 The statute
of limitations default here was caused because Mr. Myers never received notice
of the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. At the time the court
issued its decision, Mr. Schwartz was "no longer representing" Mr. Myers and
was not acting as Mr. Myers' agent. 138 Because Mr. Schwarz was not acting as
Mr. Myers' agent at the time the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued its
decision, his conduct cannot be imputed to Mr. Myers.
In contrast, at earlier stages of the case, where the defendant has a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, "[i]f the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that

131. Id. at 558.
132. See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 6.2 (requiring appointed counsel to file a motion seeking permission to
withdraw); ALA. R. APP. P. 24(b)( I) ("[a)ppointed trial counsel shall continue as defendant's counsel on
appeal unless relieved by order of the trial court").
133. ALA. R. APP. P. I 7(a).
134. Id.
135. See supra Part IV (discussing that notices of decisions are only sent to counsel if a party is
represented). If a petitioner is proceeding prose, then notices of decisions must be sent directly to him.
The rules thus provide that both represented and pro se petitioners receive notices of decisions in their
cases.
136. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991) (emphasis in original).
137. Id. at 753.
138. Declaration of Earle J. Schwarz, supra note 78, at 'II 9.
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responsibility for the default be imputed to the State." 139 It "is not the gravity of
the attorney's error that matters, but that it constitutes a violation of the
petitioner's right to counsel, so that the error must be seen as an external factor,
i.e. 'imputed to the State.".i 4 o Under Coleman, any conduct by an attorney that
causes a violation of his client's constitutional rights must be imputed to the
State. Because Mr. Schwarz's conduct caused a violation of Mr. Myers'
Fourteenth Amendment rights, Coleman requires that Mr. Schwarz's conduct
"must be seen as an external factor" that is "imputed to the State." 141 That the
state court did not send notice of its decision directly to Mr. Myers is external to
Mr. Myers. 142
This reasoning demonstrates that there is no reason a statute of limitations
default should be treated differently than a procedural default. Applying a cause
and prejudice analysis to the AEDPA statute of limitations would create
consistency between the different rules governing different types of defaults, and
would decrease the arbitrariness in the system. There is no reason a capital
post-conviction petitioner should be able to have a procedural default cured due
to attorney abandonment but be executed if such abandonment causes a statute of
limitations default instead.

139. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 754 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 ( 1986).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 752 (defining conduct external to a petitioner as "something that cannot fairly be attributed
to him").

